-AbstractThe paper compares the effects of financial deregulation and regulation in emerging market economies. The findings imply that, in contrast to common belief, financial regulation and deregulation do not work symmetrically. The related mechanisms differ in the way they affect domestic interest rates as well as borrowing and investment decisions. Two main reasons support this hypothesis. First of all, it has to be considered that domestic firms, in the initial situation, have already determined a specific size of enterprise. Since it is usually easier to expand operational activities than to reverse them, at least in the short-run, a change in domestic capital mobility would then have different effects on domestic investment contingent on whether restrictions are removed or introduced. Secondly, though capital controls do affect the financing decisions of domestic firms, they are not expected to reduce the aggregate market capitalization of emerging market economies. Market-based capitalinflow controls are rather likely to shift short-term inflows to longer term inflows without declining the overall volume of inflows. This in turn may well stimulate long-term investment with higher risk-adjusted yields. Consequently, the impact of capital controls on investment and thus on growth opportunities in emerging markets has to be considered and analyzed individually and independently from the effects of financial liberalization.
Introduction
In contrast to trade liberalization there is far more controversy about financial liberalization. As financial parameters and decisions are largely subject to uncertainty and lack of information, trade in capital is much more prone to mistakes and misallocation than trade in goods and services. This in turn may evoke erroneous trends, including phenomena such as speculative bubbles, currency attacks or sudden stops of capital inflows, accompanied by economic contraction. Empirical evidence on the benefits of financial liberalization shows that the relationship between capital-account openness and growth is in fact likely to be weaker than that between current account openness and growth. For example, the results by Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) suggest that a positive effect of capital-account liberalization is contingent on the absence of macroeconomic imbalances.
Emerging markets, in particular, usually do not have the necessary infrastructure, such as strong domestic financial institutions, a sound macroeconomic framework and high standards of financial supervision, to largely benefit from financial liberalization. Openness to capital flows is thus considered as potentially destabilizing and as exposing emerging market economies to external shocks and financial hazards. Reinhart (1998 and report that in three-quarters of the cases they studied, financial liberalization preceded a banking crisis within less than five years. Their empirical analyses provide evidence that financial crises occur as the economy enters a recession, following a long-lasting boom in economic activity that was fuelled by surges in capital inflows and overinvestment. As McKinnon and Pill (1997) show, the amount of overborrowing and overinvestment is driven by implicit or explicit government guarantees of bank deposits, weak supervision, and moralhazard problems in the banking sector. Therefore the first-best solution to limit such risky open foreign-exchange positions in emerging markets would be to strengthen the financial system, especially the standards of supervision.
But until substantial progress in these areas is well under way, capital controls have been discussed as one possible solution for emerging markets to confine the potential instabilities arising from access to global capital markets.
2 By imposing some form of market-based 2 For example, Eichengreen (1999) capital-inflow controls, emerging markets are able to influence the composition of capital inflows and thus discourage those sorts of inflows which are particularly hazardous for poorcountry borrowers. Especially short-term flows are highly speculative and volatile and are therefore considered as primarily destabilizing. In this regard, DeGregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000) find empirical evidence for the fact that Chile's controls on capital inflows in the 1990s decreased short-term inflows without affecting the overall volume of flows. To the extent that short-term flows are more easily reversed, this suggests that the Chilean style of capital controls succeeded in reducing the country's degree of vulnerability to external shocks. This in turn, as concluded by Cordella (1998) , may reduce the country's risk premium, stimulate long-term investments and generate even larger aggregate inflows.
The purpose of the paper is to theoretically analyze the macroeconomic effects of such capital control implementations on emerging market economies. Thus, the research project contributes to the existing literature in two different ways. Previous studies have concentrated on financial aspects of capital account regulations by exploring the volume and compositional effects of capital controls on international capital flows. Hence to date, the impact of the introduction of capital controls on domestic investment and thus on growth opportunities has not been explored. The second contribution relates to the existing literature on financial markets and growth. The central hypothesis of the paper is that even though an increasing quantity of research is targeted on the relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth, no applicable conclusions can be drawn on financial restriction and growth.
As will be shown in the course of the paper, the assumption that capital-account restriction simply works symmetrically to capital-account liberalization can be rejected. Two main reasons support this hypothesis. First of all, it has to be considered that domestic firms, in the initial situation, have already determined a specific size of enterprise. At this stage, a change in domestic capital mobility would have different effects contingent on whether restrictions are removed or introduced. Due to institutional provisions and adjustment costs, it is in this case usually easier to expand operational activities than to reverse them, at least in the short-run. Secondly, as the review of the existing literature suggests, though capital controls do affect the financing decisions of domestic firms, they are not expected to reduce the aggregate market capitalization of emerging market economies. Market-based capitalinflow controls are rather likely to shift short-term inflows to longer term inflows without declining the overall volume of capital inflows. Hence the influence of capital controls on domestic investment can not be derived on the lines of financial liberalization. Instead, a more specific analysis is required to determine the related adjustment process as well as the new investment equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. The succeeding section presents the model which is used to illustrate the different opportunity sets of deregulation and regulation for an emerging market economy. Following McKinnon and Pill (1997) , the paper relies on a highly simplified Fisherian model of intertemporal borrowing and investing. Since McKinnon and Pill focus on the effects of financial liberalization, section 3 briefly reviews the central findings of their work. On this basis, section 4 analyses and discusses the different effects of financial regulation on the real domestic interest rate and the supply of foreign capital.
Section 5 thereafter arranges the chosen intertemporal model to allow for the subsequent analysis of financial regulation. According to this, section 6 explores the specific adjustment path of the emerging economy in response to an introduction of some form of market-based capital-inflow controls and determines the new equilibrium. Section 7 generalizes and extends the analysis by discussing possible consequences of relaxing some of the underlying assumptions. The final section summarizes and concludes the findings and considers some directions for future research.
Model
Based on the theoretical framework by McKinnon and Pill (1997) , the optimal investment decision of the emerging economy over time is modeled into a simple two-period Fisherian approach of borrowing and investing.
3 As in McKinnon and Pill, the borrowing and lending decisions are made in real, rather than in nominal terms, and all financial flows are intermediated through domestic banks. Since banks are the only source of borrowing in this model, a credit channel exists from bank lending to real activity. 4 3 A detailed illustration of the standard Fisherian model is given e.g. in Hirshleifer (1970) , chapters two and three. 4 The assumption of a bank-based emerging market economy corresponds to the studies of Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) and Bose and Neumann (2005) , showing that financial systems tend to be more market-based in countries with higher national income. Their research supports the view that economies undergo different stages of financial systems, starting from a predominantly bank-intermediated system of debt financing to an increasing use of equity, provided by stock markets. 
to reach the productive optimum which is given by equation
where i Y is the firm's endowment in period i [with 2 1,
Q is the level of produced quantities in period i , P denotes the proceeds in period 2
and r j indicates the current applying interest rate. As the firm-household, in the domestic closed economy, may also choose to borrow or save on the domestic capital market at the interest rate r , the productive solution determines the highest attainable market line (.) M .
Thus, secondly, the firm moves along the market line to its preferred consumption (
which satisfies equation:
with r r j = .
According to McKinnon and Pill, the function of safe domestic investment (.) T is assumed to display a discontinuity in returns. After a discrete setup cost I crit , further investment will generate increasing yields. Then, beyond a certain level of investment, overall returns will relatively diminish. 5 However, as all borrowing in order to finance domestic investment is intermediated through the domestic banking system, a bias towards risky investments exists. Since domestic banks enjoy government guarantees in the form of implicit or explicit bail-out provisions, they disregard the risk of bad investment outcomes and unduly increase domestic borrowing. In case of inadequate bank supervision, the excessive bank lending hence generates another investment function (.) T risk . Except for a truncated lower tail of the function, the probability distribution for the expected payoff to new investments has the same shape as curve (.) T . The fact that the investment locus extends to the left into the second quadrant indicates simply that investment opportunities exceed the current endowment.
Figure 1
Aggregate Credit Risk in the Domestically Liberalized Economy
Within this closed economy, the aggregate wealth constraint
holds. As the capital account, by definition, remains closed, firm-households have to compete for the limited domestic investment resources. The resultant increase in the domestic interest rate to r risk restrains consumption and investment in period 1. Thus, current saving does not fall: Some firm-households borrow in order to invest in the productive technology, while the others become net depositors in the banking system. Therefore, even though adverse investment outcomes could cause severe problems between domestic debtors and creditors, all risks are curbed within the domestic economy.
Financial deregulation and the overborrowing syndrome
To analyze the effects of financial liberalization, McKinnon and Pill (1997) 
If overall returns to capital are lower than necessary to repay the external creditors, extensive loan defaults could cause a collapse of the banking system followed by a financial crisis and economic contraction. 
Thus, within this framework, financial liberalization tends to provoke a boom-and-bustcycle in emerging market economies. This outcome corresponds to the frequently cited studies by Reinhart (1998 and on the correlation between capitalaccount liberalization and financial crises. Their studies provide empirical evidence that financial crises are typically preceded by problems in the banking sector, which in turn are often triggered by financial liberalization. They conclude that financial liberalization might fuel excessive credit expansion resulting in an investment and lending boom, which is likely to turn into a bust and a recession. According to this view, Reisen and Soto (2001) show, that in economies with undercapitalized banking systems foreign bank lending would lead to overfinancing of hazardous investments.
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The above-described model illustrates that the magnitude of such overinvestment is driven by implicit or explicit government guarantees of bank deposits, weak supervision, and moralhazard problems in the banking sector. Prudential supervision and the quality of institutions therefore reduce the probability of financial crises and have a substantial impact on economic growth in the long run.
10 This relationship is especially significant for open economies, as theoretically shown in section 2 and 3 of this paper as well as empirically emphasized by Bussière and Fratzscher (2004) .
To control potential instabilities arising from access to global capital markets, the firstbest solution would therefore be to implement regulatory reforms and to strengthen the domestic financial system, for example by means of liquidity requirements on the banking system. In case of a strong domestic regulatory system, banks are no longer able to transfer most of the credit risk (and currency risk, inasmuch as monetary considerations are regarded as well) on to the government and are hence prevented from unduly discounting bad macroeconomic outcomes. As a consequence, domestic banks are enforced to hedge against credit (and exchange) risk. The domestic interest rate under supervision sv r therefore exceeds the world rate by the risk premium, which in many, if not most, emerging markets, is positive 11 : * r r sv > . By this means, the adverse spill-over effects from moral hazard are restrained and the incentive for additional overborrowing is eliminated.
But until high standards of banking regulation and financial supervision are well implemented an increasing number of economists are advocating the (re-)imposition of capital controls in emerging market economies to supplement domestic prudential regulation. 9 Given the low profitability rates of domestic investments before the Asian financial crisis, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) even suggest that several investments may rather have represented some form of consumption. 10 Empirical evidence in support of this view is given by Shimpalee and Breuer (2006) , Bussière and Fratzscher (2004) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) . 11 Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2004) show, that emerging market bonds carry a substantial risk premium over comparable risk-less bonds.
Financial regulation and its effect on the real domestic interest rate and international credit supply
In incompletely reformed economies, capital controls can extend prudential regulation by restraining excessive extension of international credit by domestic banks and other marketmaking institutions. Concerning this matter, most supporters of regulating international borrowing by emerging market economies refer to Chile's holding-period tax as the model for other emerging markets (Stiglitz 1999) . To control the surge of capital inflows the Chilean authorities between 1991 and 1998 implemented an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR), which meant that a percentage of the inflowing capital had to be deposited in a noninterest bearing account in Chile's Central Bank. Regardless of the loan maturity, a fixed cost was hence imposed on foreign capital, so that short-term inflows were more heavily taxed than long-term capital flows.
As a consequence, the maturity structure of foreign debt is likely to increase, since expensive short-term credit tends to be substituted by cheaper long-term credit. Evidence for this relationship is given, for example, by DeGregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000) . In their empirical study on the effectiveness of capital controls in Chile, they detect a compositional shift from short-term to longer-term inflows. Given that short-term debt is inherently more volatile and easier to reverse than long-term debt, the imposition of capital controls is therefore likely to reduce a country's vulnerability to external shocks and therewith "the probability of a banking and/or Balance of Payment crisis (driven by either fundamentals or sunspots)" (DeGregorio, Edwards and Valdés 2000, p. 77) . Cordella (1998) moreover concludes that this may well reduce the country's risk premium and increase risk-adjusted yields on emerging markets investments.
Thus, financial regulation pulls the emerging market's interest rate in opposite directions.
One the one hand the imposition of capital controls φ is associated with a higher domestic cost of capital, because the domestic firm-household has to borrow with a tax in excess of the world interest rate. DeGregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000) compute different measures of this tax-equivalent cost, but as the present study abstracts from currency risk and other monetary considerations, the most simplified formula of this tax-equivalent cost µ (without other taxes and without exchange rate risk) is added to the model below 12 :
where the reserve requirement is a fraction u of the credit, h is the holding period of the URR denoted in month, and k is the maturity of the credit.
13
The second effect on the real domestic interest rate is connected with the benefits from limiting moral hazard in the emerging economy's financial market. As presented above, capital controls, by reducing the country premium country ρ , on the other hand tend to decrease the real domestic interest rate. Accordingly, the two opposite influences of financial regulation upon the real domestic interest rate can be integrated in the following way: 
To keep the following analysis as simple as possible, it is subsequently assumed, that the emerging market authorities accomplish this specific value crit φ of financial regulation. This assumption corresponds to the empirical findings by Herrera and Valdés (2001) , documenting that capital controls have a quite small impact on interest rate differentials. In this regard, they 12 Among others, Cárdenas and Barrera (1997) and Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998) have also used this simplified equation in their research on capital controls. 13 Moreover, in the case of h k > , where the investment horizon exceeds the required URR period, the simplified equation of the tax-equivalent assumes that the proceeds of the reserve requirement is invested at * i .
suggest "that the power of capitals controls might be smaller than what is usually believed" (Herrera and Valdés, 2001, p. 397) . But one might as well propose that an increase in the interest rate differential is rather counteracted by the decrease of the country premium.
This would also explain why empirical studies, up to now, are not able to unambiguously identify a significant decline in the overall volume of capital inflows following the imposition of capital controls.
14 As Cordella (1998) theoretically recommends, to the extent that capital inflow controls succeed in making emerging markets less vulnerable to sudden changes in sentiment by international investors, they even may, ceteris paribus, increase the supply of foreign capital.
14 For example Montiel and Reinhart (1999) , DeGregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000) and Campion and Neumann (2003) find that capital inflow controls have small volume effects. In contrast to this, a more restrictive policy on capital outflows is likely to decrease net capital inflows, as investment decisions become less irreversible (Labán and Larraín, 1997) . For that reason, the present study is solely oriented on restrictions on capital inflows since they manage to supplement prudential regulation and restrain moral hazard in the financial system without reducing the overall supply of capital.
Modification of the model in order to examine financial regulation
Based on what has been presented above, the modified approach of intertemporal borrowing and investment decisions under financial regulation satisfies the succeeding assumptions.
Assumption 1 The level of domestic investment is unchanged compared to the situation of financial liberalization: I .
As documented in the preceding section, the aggregate volume of inflowing capital is virtually unaffected by the imposition of capital controls. This leads to the conclusion that the level of domestic investment has not changed significantly despite the imposition of capital controls. An appropriate explanation for this issue could be that financial liberalization, in the initial situation, provokes an expansion of operational activities and thus determines a specific size of enterprise. Then, even with capital controls in place, a certain level of domestic investment is fixed, at least in the short run.
For example due to institutional provisions e.g. protection against dismissal or long-term operational agreements, it is usually easier to expand operational activities than to reverse them. Moreover, empirical literature has provided substantial evidence of investment irreversibilities arising from adjustment costs of capital. 15 "Once capital is in place at an establishment there are costs associated with detaching and moving it" (Veracierto, 2002, p. 181). According to Abel and Eberly (1996) , an investment is characterized by costly reversibility when a firm faces a resale price which is lower than its purchase price. Hence Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) conclude that firms are much more inclined to expanding their stock of capital than to reducing it. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that preceding period's investment determines current productive activity.
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Assumption 2
Productive activity is carried out according to the safe investment function (.) T . This ensures that the domestic wealth constraint is satisfied.
Capital controls as per section 4 tend to restrain moral hazard in the emerging economy's financial market. By this means domestic borrowing is predominantly used in order to invest in the safe productive technology represented by the investment function (.) T . To the extent that financial regulation tilts the composition of capital inflows toward longer maturity, this may allow for investments of longer duration with higher risk-adjusted yields. The likelihood of capital controls to increase domestic risk-adjusted yields is theoretically brought up by Cordella (1998, p. 738) and DeGregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000, p. 77), but also McKinnon and Pill (1999, p. 36 ) indirectly refer to this relationship. Consequently, as financial regulation reduces the bias of the emerging market to overborrow, all loans are likely to be repaid in period 2 .
Assumption 3
The real domestic interest rate still equals the world interest rate: * r r = .
15 Confer Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a survey. 16 Similar to this conclusion of a downward inelasticity of investment in response to an introduction of capital inflow controls, Hartman (1985) and Sinn (1990) show that taxes on international profit repatriations, by representing an unavoidable cost to mature firms, do also not reduce mature firm's investment activities but are only relevant to new firms' investment decisions.
Given the trade-off presented in the section above, the different effects of financial regulation counteract each other, thereby having a quite small impact on the real interest differential as a whole. For reasons of simplicity, and since the domestic interest rate equaled the world interest rate in the setting before regulation, real interest parity is firstly assumed to still hold. However, the findings ought to be extended and generalized by relaxing some of these underlying assumptions. In this respect, section 7 discusses possible consequences of relaxing the above described assumptions and derives some general conclusions on the impact of financial regulation.
Financial regulation and the new equilibrium
To compare the effects of financial regulation with the former setting of liberalization, the new equilibrium in the capital-controlled economy has to be determined. With some form of market-based capital-inflow controls in place, the domestic firm-household now maximizes
subject to the constraint:
with ) (I f P = . Given this opportunity set, the Lagrange function is formed as:
, (12) where 1 λ and 2 λ are undetermined Lagrange multipliers. Maximizing L with respect to φ 1 C and φ 2 C , the first order conditions obtained are:
Shifting the 1 λ terms to the right-hand sides, and then dividing the first equation by the second, leads to:
which gives the well established maximum condition of intertemporal optimization. It says that the firm-household's optimal time pattern of consumption is achieved by equating the interest rate * r to the rate of time preference
However, as the investment value is fixed at its original level I , the point of intersection of (.) T and (.) M determines the position of the market line. Thus firm-households are prevented from maximizing productive investment and, in turn, from fully optimizing their behavior over time. Correspondingly Figure 3 shows a realized utility under regulation φ U which is lower than utility U that could be achieved in the long run, where investment decision is not fixed but endogenous and may therefore be optimized as well.
Even though utility in the internationally liberalized economy risk U appears to exceed utility under financial regulation as well, φ U is to be preferred over risk U as moral hazard and thus overinvestment is restrained through capital controls. While the level of investment I is still higher than would be optimal, domestic production generates a certain outcome 2 Q which guarantees full repayment of external creditors' claims. In this manner financial regulation succeeds in reducing the highly destabilizing effects of capital mobility and with it the emerging market's vulnerability to external shocks. However, two reservations ought to be acknowledged. Firstly, because of the existence of loopholes, market-based capital-inflow controls gradually lose power. Hence a steady implementation of adequate bank regulation and supervision would be required to also ensure risk management of banks in the long-run.
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Figure 3 Intertemporal Production and Consumption in the Financially Regulated Economy
Secondly, the underlying assumptions may have a strong impact on the results and thus on the evaluation of capital controls. To address this issue, the succeeding section therefore examines how sensitive the results are to changes in assumptions. 17 As such structural reforms are usually accompanied by further real-side reforms, productivity might improve as well, shifting the function of safe investment projects (.) T in an upward direction.
Consequences of relaxing some of the above assumptions
The effects of relaxing the above presumed restrictions can be discussed by carrying out comparative static analysis, assessing the impact of a change in parameter on the equilibrium value of a variable. Totally differentiating the first order conditions and arranging the exogenous components of the optimization problem on the right-hand sides gives:
The total differentials can be regarded as a system of linear equations of the form: 
is clearly positive for positive, but declining marginal utility,
, the impact of a change in parameter on the optimal composition of consumption is contingent on the determinants ij D .
That is, firstly, the partial derivative of first and second period consumption with respect to the interest rate: 
A change in the interest rate, through the substitution effect (22), will clearly negatively affect first period consumption. In contrast to this, the impact on second period consumption is indefinite. As can be seen from equation (23), the direction of the income effect depends on whether borrowing or lending countries are considered. Since this paper focuses on financial instabilities of recipient emerging markets, second period consumption tends to react inversely to interest rate movements, because the burden of debt rises in response to an increasing interest rate and falls as interest rates decline.
As for the case of capital inflow controls in Chile, DeGregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000) empirically identify a slight increase in real interest rates. Therefore, assuming ceteris paribus, Figure 4 below visually demonstrates the effects of an increase in the domestic interest rate. However, a decline in interest rates would simply work analogously. With regard to borrowing countries, an increase in the real interest rate will, ceteris paribus, reduce both first as well as second period consumption and thus domestic utility. Still, it has to be emphasized that, being protected from moral hazard, the emerging economy realizes a more secure level of utility, compared to the situation of total capital mobility. Moreover, DeGregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000) note that the rise in Chilean interest rates was only temporary and rather small 18 and, above all, actively intended, as capital controls in Chile were used to accompany monetary tightening. Accordingly financial regulation might as well decrease real interest rates insofar as it succeeds in reducing the emerging country's risk premium.
Figure 4 Effects of a Change in the Domestic Interest Rate
Secondly, the partial derivatives of first and second period consumption with respect to investment are obtained as follows:
18 "Domestic interest rate increases after two month, peaking after 6 month and dying slowly 12 month after [a one standard deviation] shock [to the unremunerated reserve requirement]. The magnitude of this peak is small, at about 0.1% to 0.15%" DeGregorio, Edwards and Valdés (2000, p. 80) .
As can be seen from equations (24) and (25) Since in section 6 the fixed investment was higher than optimal investment, that is
, a reduction of investment, until its optimal point r dI dP
, would in this place generate higher profits and in turn higher domestic utility. However, for the case of costly reversibility of investment, optimal production may only be achieved in the long-run.
Conclusion and Outlook
This paper explores a comparison between the effects of financial deregulation and regulation in emerging market economies. The findings imply that financial regulation and deregulation do not work symmetrically but differ in the way they affect domestic interest rates, foreign credit supply as well as domestic borrowing and investment decisions. Whereas financial liberalization tends to spur domestic investment by provoking surges of capital inflows and typically reducing domestic interest rates, a reversion of the liberalization process is not likely to have inverse effects. First of all, it has to be considered that domestic firms, in the initial situation, have already determined a specific size of enterprise. At this stage, a change in capital mobility would have different effects contingent on whether restrictions are removed or introduced. Due to institutional provisions and adjustment costs, it is in this case usually easier to expand operational activities than to reverse them, at least in the short-run.
Secondly, as the review of the existing literature suggests, though capital controls do affect the financing decisions of domestic firms, they are not expected to reduce the aggregate market capitalization of emerging market economies. Market-based capital-inflow controls are rather likely to shift short-term inflows to longer term inflows without declining the overall volume of capital inflows. Hence, the influence of capital controls on domestic investment can not be derived on the lines of financial liberalization. Instead, a more specific analysis is required to determine the related adjustment process as well as the new investment equilibrium. As could be shown in the course of the paper, the imposition of market-based capital-inflow controls leads the emerging market economy to a new equilibrium with a lower amount of overborrowing.
Thus, the research project contributes to the existing literature in two different ways.
Previous studies have concentrated on financial aspects of capital account regulations by exploring the volume and compositional effects of capital controls on international capital flows. Hence to date, the impact of an introduction of capital controls on domestic investment and thus on growth opportunities has not been explored. The second contribution relates to the existing literature on financial markets and growth. Even though an increasing quantity of research is targeted on the relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth, it could be shown that no applicable conclusions can be drawn on financial restriction and growth. As a consequence, the impact of capital controls on investment and thus on growth opportunities in emerging markets has to be considered and analyzed individually and independently from the effects of financial liberalization.
In this connection, future research should pay a special attention to specific effects of financial regulation. The theoretical work in this paper could be extended to directly investigate changes in investment profitability that may result from an imposition of capital inflow controls. To the extent that controls on capital inflows succeed in restraining moral hazard in emerging economy's financial markets and in tilting the composition of capital inflows toward longer maturity, this may allow for investments of longer duration with higher risk-adjusted yields. This suggests that investment profitability is likely to improve.
Appendix
Decomposition of the real interest differential
The real interest differential is defined as
where i and * i are the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates and π E and * π E are the expected domestic and foreign inflation. This relationship can be decomposed into:
where f is the forward exchange rate premium (or discount) on the current exchange rate and e Eˆ is the expected depreciation of the domestic currency. Frankel (1992, p. 199 ) calls the country premium country ρ , as it captures country specific factors that keep nominal interest rates from equalizing internationally. Thus, in contrast to the currency premium covering the probability that the exchange rate will change, the country premium reflects differences in the political jurisdiction in which the financial assets are issued. distort the interest parity condition, the country premium might just as well be negative or positive (Taylor, 1995, p. 17 
